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Abstract 
This paper presents a strategic statistical model of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement, 
with a special focus on developing countries. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO DSU) 
allows WTO members to enforce the trade liberalization commitments made by other WTO members 
over the different trade liberalization rounds. The WTO DSU has been put forwards as a means to level 
the playfield between developing and developed WTO member states. This paper empirically studies 
whether developing countries still settle for less beneficial outcomes, and whether this type of countries 
use the WTO litigation process to the same extent as their developed counterparts. We empirically 
estimate the determinants of the decisions of developing and developed countries within the WTO 
dispute settlement structure. We allow for forward-looking governments, that take into account their 
expectations regarding the actions of the other party in the dispute.  
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1. Introduction 
Countries are affected by the trade policies of other countries. Increased economic globalization has 
only strengthened this evolution. The trade interdependence of countries can lead to conflicts and 
disputes.  
The WTO provides a solution for the settlement of trade conflicts. Members to this organization have 
made binding commitments over trade policies and have liberalized their trade over several trade 
rounds. Conflicts over the implementation and the consistency of trade policies occur, and at such 
instances, the countries involved discuss and negotiate over the trade policy at hand. When these 
negotiations fail, the contested trade policy can be brought before the WTO which then revises the 
trade policy. When the WTO was established in 1994, as successor to the GATT, the WTO DSU was 
annexed to the WTO agreements. This WTO DSU delineates the process of litigation of trade policies at 
the WTO.   
Over the last two decades, WTO members have made intensive use of the WTO DSU. About 500 cases 
have so far been investigated by specialized WTO panels. These have resulted in a variety of outcomes, 
as the process of WTO litigation allows parties to settle a dispute and thus stop the litigation process at 
given times. Parties to a dispute can for example at all times find a common solution which would herald 
the end of the litigation process. However, some disputes escalate and result in heightened conflict 
when one of the parties decides to involve WTO panels, or when the defendant decides against 
implementing the panel’s recommendations. 
Clearly filing a complaint at the WTO already bears signs of the escalation of a trade dispute. Generally, 
trade disputes are solved during bilateral talks. Seeking involvement of the WTO is often already a last 
means to push for the removal of the trade barrier in question. However, when consultations fail (the 
first step of WTO litigation), the dispute can escalate further. As with a recent string of complaints 
against Argentina,i the request for WTO panels often goes hand in hand with heightened tensions and 
frustrations. At the same time, it is clear that settling earlier in the WTO’s dispute game might not 
enable countries to fully realize the benefits they might have realized by sitting out the full ride.  
In this paper, we study the escalation of trade disputes within the WTO DSU. We analyze the first 426 
trade disputes at the WTO. We pay particular attention to developing countries, as these have been 
found to face additional challenges in navigating the WTO DSU. Additionally, we investigate the effect of 
3 
 
several other variables. We use statistical backwards induction and show that developing countries 
indeed make different decisions within the WTO at the two main escalation phases. Moreover, we find 
evidence that a variety of other measures also influence the decisions taken by parties within the WTO 
DSU. 
The next section provides an overview of the relevant academic literature and position the paper 
therein. The third section elaborates on our basic set-up. Section four presents the game-theoretic 
model of the WTO’s dispute settlement, and lays down our strategic statistical approach. The results of 
the latter are discussed in the fifth section. Section six looks deeper into the actions taken by developing 
countries in the WTO DSU. We conclude in section seven.  
2. Literature review 
The WTO and its DSU have received ample scholarly attention over the last years. Scholars, observers 
and practitioners studied the WTO’s DSU from economic, legal and political points of view. The result is 
an impressive body of work covering many of the question regarding the functioning of the WTO’s DSU. 
Only a handful studies have dealt with the escalation of trade disputes. The question why some disputes 
are not settled during the consultations phase, and why some disputes end up in CVMs remains largely 
unaddressed. This is all the more puzzling when one takes into account that the WTO itself pushes 
countries to either settle during the initial consultation phase, or during the implementation phase.     
Guzman and Simmons (2002) examine which kind of disputes tend to escalate to a panel phase. They 
explain that in cases where no side payments are possible, or when the disputed policy is discontinuous 
(meaning that there is less incremental policy adoption room), the dispute is more likely to end up with 
panel involvement.  
Focusing more on the costs of a dispute than the policy maneuver room, Busch and Reinhardt (2000) 
find that escalation should be exceptional as the parties to a dispute stand to gain more from early 
settlement. Settling early is more likely to induce the policy concessions desired by the plaintiff. They 
show that the anticipation, rather than the realization, of a ruling boosts the bargaining possibilities, 
leading to a mutual beneficial settlement compared to a panel ruling. Reinhardt (2001) builds an 
incomplete information model, and argues along the same line. His results are driven by the uncertainty 
of the defendant regarding the panel ruling.    
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Van Kerckhoven and Crombez (2015) study the impact of the cost of litigation. In that paper, we find 
that disputes are only initiated when the plaintiff is rather certain of a violation. Moreover, the parties 
can settle a dispute before panels are established at more favorable terms. Consequently, escalation can 
be explained by political motives, rather than economic cost-benefit analysis. A dispute only escalates 
when the parties are unwilling to draft a reasonable settlement offer and are willing to bear the costs of 
escalation at the different escalation phases.   
In a recent paper, Yildrim and De Bièvre (2015) look into the determinants of the escalation of WTO 
disputes in which a developing country initiates a case against the EU. They identify two escalation 
phases similar to the ones employed in this paper. They find that the EU’s behavior in these escalation 
phases is driven by the presence of third parties (who follow the dispute settlement proceedings) and 
trade dependency and that the EU’s reaction does not depend on the state of development of the party 
initiating the dispute.   
Some other papers have studied the functioning of, and the challenges faced by, developing countries in 
the WTO. Two main issues have been identified. The first issue is related to the initial step to file a 
complaint at the WTO. Developing countries might lack sufficient resources to monitor and recognize 
possible WTO violations. Most of the developing countries might not be able to recognize litigation 
opportunities. Van Kerckhoven and Crombez (2015b) study the government-industry interaction that 
might lead to WTO litigation. This paper demonstrates that without an industry advocating a WTO 
complaint, less complaints will be filed as it is hence up to the government to identify potential WTO-
inconsistent trade barriers. Governments of developing countries typically lack the information and staff 
to identify these. Busch and Reinhardt (2003b) argue that the private information of the players, 
whereby a poorer WTO member typically has less access to information, makes developing countries 
lose out even before panels are established. Moreover, most of them have no permanent Geneva-based 
delegation to keep them up to date of the daily work at the WTO (Busch, Reinhardt and Schaffer, 2009). 
Horn, Nordström and Mavroidis (1999) build a model that studies a country’s probability of detecting 
and contesting a trade barrier. They argue that the differences in diversity and value of trade between 
countries can explain why some countries initiate more disputes. The second issue relates to the panel 
phase and the preparation of a case for litigation. WTO litigation is costly and time-consuming (Sevilla, 
1998). Developing countries lack the legal capacity to absorb the costs of adequately preparing a case 
for WTO litigation.ii Consequently, they have to rely on outside experts and are less sophisticated buyers 
of legal advice (Trade and Development Centre, 1999). Van Kerckhoven and Crombez (2015) study in 
5 
 
more detail how a cost disadvantage pushes developing countries to take different decisions within the 
WTO DSU. In that paper, we find that developing countries will file less complaints, and if they do so, 
settle more easily before the panel stage, since they lack the financial resources and legal capacity to 
prepare adequately for the panel stage. The latter finding also applies to developing country defendants. 
Busch and Reinhardt (2003b) argue that the lack of legal capacity is the main challenge for developing 
countries in international trade litigation. Bown (2004, 2004b, 2005) studies when negatively affected 
parties engage in WTO litigation, both as complainant and as a third party. He finds that, among others, 
the capacity to absorb expected litigation costs, and the political economy costs due to engaging in WTO 
litigation are important determinants in this decision.  
So far, few studies have incorporated a strategic approach to the study of the WTO DSU. A notable 
exception to this is Sattler, Spiker and Bernauer (2014). Their focus on the WTO DSU as an enforcement 
device versus the WTO DSU as an informational device provides interesting evidence that the WTO 
mainly works as an enforcement device. Our understanding of the WTO DSU, as a prime example of a 
clear-cut legislative process in which states make deliberate choices, is to benefit greatly from further 
strategic studies. We contribute to the literature by presenting a strategic structural model that looks 
into the determinants of the escalation of trade conflicts within the WTO DSU. More specifically, by 
looking into the decisions of developing and developed countries at two escalation phases, this paper 
provides an important contribution to the existing literature as it unveils some of the forces driving 
developing countries, both as defendants and as plaintiffs in these two different escalation phases. The 
next section  portrays the basic set-up of our approach by lining out the two escalation phases and the 
variables that might determine the actions of countries within the WTO DSU. 
3. The set-up 
3.1 The two escalation phases 
A trade conflict between 2 (or more) WTO member states can result in the filing of a complaint at the 
WTO.iii When the provisions in the WTO DSU are called upon to assist with the settlement of a trade 
dispute, a certain sequence of steps are taken.  
When a country (“the complainant or plaintiff”) initiates a WTO dispute regarding the trade policy of 
another member of the organization (“the defendant”), the parties are first encouraged to engage in 
consultations in order to find a satisfactory solution without resorting to litigation (Art.4 of the DSU). In 
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this paper, it is the complainant who will decide whether to propose a settlement offer that the 
defendant can accept.  
When consultations fail to produce a mutual satisfactory outcome, the dispute escalates to the panel 
phase. This generally indicates that the conflict between the trade partners over the trade policy at hand 
is too large or that the parties’ positions are too far apart. For example in the European Communities-
Measures prohibiting the importation and marketing of (DS-400 European Communities — Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products), the EU took action after a public outcry, 
whereas Canada decided to stand behind the thousands of Canadians that depend on the seal harvest to 
provide a livelihood for their families.iv Clearly, when the positions of the parties are so far apart, 
consultations are deemed to fail. Moreover, in the seal case, the public on both sides of the Atlantic 
would not easily be satisfied with a negotiated deal. 
When consultations fail, a panel of WTO experts is established (Art.6, Art. 7 and Art.8 of the DSU). The 
panel rules on the consistency of the defendant’s trade policy with the WTO provisions. After it has 
released its recommendations in the form of a report, the parties to the dispute are allowed to contest 
the legal correctness of the panel findings. If such an appeal concurs, the Appellate Body investigates 
whether the panel has erred in its judgment in its legal interpretation.  
After the panel has released its ruling, the defendant is requested to implement the panel’s 
recommendations. Moreover, the dispute can still be settled bilaterally. In the case of a bilateral 
settlement and when the defendant swiftly implements the panel ruling, the conflict ends rather 
peacefully. In this case, the defendant makes at least some commitments and adapts its policy. When 
the defendant fails to implement the panel recommendations, the dispute further escalates. The 
plaintiff can then request the authorization to temporary suspend (part of) its WTO concessions towards 
the defendant.  
However, the decision of the defendant to refuse to adapt its policy is often not greeted favorably by  
the parties, as this generally results in a larger conflict, and significant public attention. Hence, the 
defendant makes the decision between adapting its policy, or leaving the policy as is, which might result 
in CVMs. Standing strong by keeping the policy in place is hence a costly undertaking, as the CVMs to 
offset the plaintiff’s loss might be quite substantial. However, this might be more beneficial in certain 
cases, in particular when the public supports the defendant’s government stance. For example, in the 
series of disputes revolving around beef hormones, the European public is concerned with the health 
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risks of hormone treated beef, thus supporting the EU in standing strong.v  The division between policy 
adoption and standing strong allows us to assign a relatively large amount of observations to each of the 
different outcomes of a dispute. Table 1 displays the number of trade conflicts at the two escalation 
phases,vi namely, the panel phase and the implementation phase.  
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
This table shows us that a majority of the disputes get settled during negotiations in the consultations 
phase. A minority of the disputes lead to the establishment of WTO panels. After the panels have 
reviewed the trade policy at hand, most disputes end with a policy change. This can be done by either 
implementing the panel recommendations, or by finding a post-panel agreement. A significant amount 
of disputes however escalate further whereby the defendant decides to keep its policy as is, and the 
plaintiff requests the authorization to suspend concessions to the defendant. 
However, these numbers only tell part of the story. If we study the disputes in greater detail, it becomes 
clear that there are several variables that might determine how far a trade conflict escalates within the 
WTO dispute settlement.  
3.2 The determinants of the escalation of trade conflicts 
In this paper, we focus mainly on the economic variables that might drive a country to escalate a 
dispute. 
We study the impact of eight variables that might determine whether a WTO conflict escalates in the 
two panel phases: whether the plaintiff is a developing country, whether the ACWL has been involved, 
whether the defendant is a developing country, whether the trade policy concerns a political sensitive 
industry, whether the trade policy concerns a primary sector, the trade dependency between the 
parties, whether either party has experience with CVMs, and whether the dispute involves multiple 
complainants. 
It is a well-established finding that developing countries are, even with all the support and exceptions 
offered to this type of countries, falling short in realizing the same benefits from WTO litigation as their 
more developed counterparts. We use a dummy variable for all developing country plaintiffs and 
defendants.vii We expect to see settlement more often during the consultation phase when either of the 
parties is a developing country. Wary of the high cost of referring a dispute to the WTO panels, 
developing countries might be more inclined to settle in the consultations phase than developed 
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countries.viii Moreover, once a panel is established, we expect developing country defendants to 
implement the panel’s recommendations more often, rather than risking the installation of CVMs on 
their exports. CVMs can be very harmful for developing countries, as their exports mostly consist of very 
competitive labor-intense products.  
A developing country plaintiff prefers bilateral settlement in the last phase (although it is the defendant 
that choses at  this decision node). Developing country plaintiffs might find it difficult to threaten with 
CVMs. They might fear that installing CVMs might bring havoc to their relation with the counterparty, 
from whom they might need trade flows and aid. Moreover, developing countries typically do not 
consume enough of the defendant’s exports to credibly threaten with CVMs (Dam, 1970). 
In total, 174 developing countries have launched a complaint at the WTO DSU, of which 74 complaints 
have resulted in the establishment of a panel. Of these 74, 19 complaints were not implemented by the 
defendant, and resulted in an escalation of the dispute whereby the authorization to suspend 
concessions was requested by the developing country plaintiff. Developing country defendants have 
been targeted in 161 complaints. 106 of these disputes were settled during the consultation phase, and 
55 of the complaints against a developing country were reviewed by WTO panels. Only four of these 
complaints resulted in the request to authorize a suspension of concessions.ix   
As a third variable, the involvement of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) might have scaled down 
the differences between developing countries and developed countries. As the ACWL provides 
developing countries with legal support at a reduced cost or pro bono (for more see Van der Borght, 
1999), its support might offset the developing nature of some parties to a WTO dispute. Bown and 
McCulloch (2010) empirically investigate the working of the ACWL, and argue that the introduction of 
the ACWL has not been able to expand the number of developing countries that get involved in the WTO 
DSU. Nonetheless, it has helped parties that were already part of a dispute to start making more ample 
use of trade litigation. Involvement of the ACWL could hence blur our results when looking at the 
actions of developing countries, since the actions taken with support of the ACWL might mirror the ones 
taken by developed countries more. To control for this, we add a dummy variable indicating whether 
the ACWL has been involved or not. With regards to ACWL support for defendants (8 times), all cases 
escalated to the WTO panels, followed by a policy change afterwards, leaving us with only little 
variation. When a plaintiff calls upon the ACWL for support (24 times), we expect that the ACWL’s 
involvement results in more panel rulings, but that after a panel ruling more settlement will be 
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witnessed, since the ACWL is there to a large extent to make full use of settlement in order to reap more 
benefits (Busch and Reinhardt, 2003).  
Fourth, we include trade dependency as a variable. Bown (2004 and 2005) looks into the WTO disputes 
related to American anti-dumping cases. He finds that the extent to which the plaintiff can punish the 
defendant by erecting CVMs on the defendant’s products is an important determinant of the outcome 
of WTO litigation. Guzman and Simmons (2002) find that higher exports from the defendant to the 
complainant result in more panel involvement.  The reason might be that installing CVMs is more 
feasible when a higher percentage of the defendant’s export go the plaintiff’s market. Horn, Nordstrom 
and Mavroidis (1999) relate to this research and find that export diversity influences the route of a WTO 
dispute. In particular, developing country plaintiffs might find it difficult to install CVMs on the products 
of the defendant. Due to their dependence on imported goods, and the typically lower size of imports, 
punishing another WTO member by installing CVMs is rather difficult. The other way around, a 
developing defendant can be seriously hurt when CVMs are installed on its exports.x Bown (2005) and 
Horn, Mavroidis, and Nördstrom (1999) empirically find evidence for the fact that installing CVMs is a 
difficult exercise when the plaintiff has only very little imports from the defendant. For this reason, we 
calculated the following: 𝑋𝑋
𝐷𝐷→𝐶𝐶
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷, with 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷→𝐶𝐶  denoting exports from the defendant to the complainant, 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 the exports of the defendant. This will feature in the defendant’s decision whether or not 
to implement the panel recommendations, or escalate the dispute and hence potentially incur CVMs. A 
high export ratio is expected to lower the expected utility of CVMs. Moreover, a plaintiff is also expected 
to get a higher utility from CVMs when this measure is high.  
As a fifth variable, the experience of countries with CVMs might be important. As shown by Davis and 
Blodgett Bermeo (2009), there exists a certain learning curve towards engaging in WTO litigation. Having 
experience with CVMs increases the likelihood that the dispute leads to non-implementation. Firstly, 
this might influence the decision of the plaintiff in the first step of the game where he decides between 
settling the dispute bilaterally, or composing a panel. Secondly, this might also affect the defendant’s 
decision whether or not to implement a panel recommendation. 
Following Sattler, Spiker, and Bernauer (2014),  our sixth variable deals with political sensitive issues. 
Sattler, Spiker and Bernauer (2014) argue that all manufacturing sectors have lower political stakes than 
non-manufacturing sectors. However, we feel that this measure fails to adequately describe political 
sensitive sectors. There are various non-manufacturing sectors that are less political sensitive than some 
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manufacturing sectors. Think for example about the Boeing-Airbus dispute that has been grabbing 
newspapers headlines for some years. Since we concur that certain industries involve higher political 
stakes than others, we establish our own measurement. Some more political sensitive cases include the 
EU-US disputes on hormones and the Boeing-Airbus disputes. In general, cases related to environmental 
standards, agriculture, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures tend to be more politically sensitive 
than other cases due to their influence on health. The same holds true for disputes involving large 
employers and national champions, such as the airline industry (Crombez, Van Kerckhoven and Van 
Gestel, 2011). This relates to the difference between continuous and discontinuous policies (Guzman 
and Simmons, 2002). Tariffs are more easily adopted and offer more negotiation room than one-off 
decisions, such as whether to allow hormone-treated meat into the EU. Political sensitive disputes tend 
to revolve around these discontinuous policies. Consequently, this paper uses a dummy for all disputes 
mentioning one of the political sensitive WTO agreements. These are the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
SPS agreement, and the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (hereafter political agreements). Political 
sensitivity plays a dual role. We expect to see more bilateral settlement during the consultation phase. 
For more political sensitive cases, governments will want to avoid the potential political backlash that 
occurs when public awareness heightens. This backlash is higher when a dispute escalates to panels 
which increases the likelihood to be grabbing newspapers’ headlines. However, after a panel ruling, the 
defending party will be more inclined to stand strong and incur CVM’s rather than implement the 
panel’s recommendations. We use a dummy variable for this. 
Our seventh variable relates to whether the sector is R& D intense. Davis and Shirato (2007) looked into 
Japan’s selection of trade barriers for WTO litigation. They find that low-velocity industries, 
characterized by few product lines, low product turnover, and little R&D are more prone to be selected 
for WTO litigation. Busch and Reinhardt (2003) come up with a similar remark. Horn, Mavroidis, and 
Nordstrom (1999) also clearly show that these low-velocity industries feature remarkably extensively on 
the WTO dispute settlement list. Since WTO litigation is rather specific, industries with less R & D 
intensive products, and hence a longer life span, feature heavily on the list of WTO disputes. More R&D 
intense sectors have a quicker product turnover. Hence, they face larger opportunity costs from waiting 
and investing time and devoting resources to WTO litigation. Consequently, they are expected to feature 
less in WTO complaints, and settle earlier in the WTO dispute game. Non-R&D intense sectors on the 
other hand find it more beneficial to sit out the full WTO litigation process, since the low product 
volatility allows the complaining party to reap the benefits of WTO litigation for a long time period after 
the issue has been settled. For these sectors, the additional time that it takes to let the panels look into 
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the trade policy is less a deterrent. Indeed, involving WTO panels lengthens the time before the trade 
policy is adapted from an average of 731 days when no panels are involved upwards to an average of 
1245 days with panel involvement.  
As a last variable, we include a dummy for disputes with multiple complainants. The effect of this 
variable is a little bit less obvious. It might be that implementation is preferred because of the high cost 
of non-compliance when all complainants install CVMs on the defendant. However, it might also be that 
it is more difficult for each of these countries to install CVMs. In this paper, we break the multiple 
complainant disputes up in individual bilateral dyads. This is in line with previous empirical studies of the 
WTO. We then add a dummy variable for when a dispute involves several complainants at the same 
time. This is in line with other empirical analyses of the WTO (see Horn, Mavroidis and Nördstrom, 1999, 
Reinhardt, 2001). We do not include the multiple complainants dummy in the plaintiff’s utility function 
since we could not find any support for the question whether this results in more (or less) early 
settlement. Table 2 comprises all the variables included in the model. 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
These variables will now be tested in a strategic empirical model of the escalation of trade conflicts at 
the WTO. Our focus on the strategic behavior of defendants and plaintiffs allows us to investigate the 
determinants of the settlement and escalation of trade conflicts in a simple game theoretic framework. 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for all these variables. 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 The Data  
The dataset entails data from several  sources. All data concerning the WTO disputes were obtained 
from the Horn and Mavroidis (2011) dataset. This dataset includes the timeline, the sectors and the legal 
provisions invoked from all WTO disputes until dispute 426 (11/08/2011). We updated the disputes in 
the database to ensure that all the outcomes of the disputes were correct until 23/09/2014. Trade data 
were gathered from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) website. This dataset only includes 
combined EU trade data. Since several disputes were initiated by individual EU member states (in 
particular before 2000), we used the Eurostat dataset for the these disputes. The WITS uses the same 
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data but on the aggregate EU level, so this does not change the data measurements. We further used 
the WTO’s codification for developing countries. 
Since this paper focuses on the escalation of trade conflicts, and since we do not model the WTO panels 
as active players, we left out the 24 disputes whereby no violation by the defendant was found. 
Including these observations might have skewed our results since they do not fit within the model we 
present below where we focus on the escalation phases. Six more cases had to be dropped since we 
lacked information for at least one of the variables. Moreover, since nine cases are still ongoing, which 
means that in the last 3 years some action was undertaken (either the composition of a panel or a 
panel/AB ruling), we could not include these as the final outcome is yet to be determined.xi In the end, 
we have 236 cases of settlement during the consultation phase, 130 disputes that resulted in 
implementation of the panel’s recommendations, and 45 observations where the authority to retaliate 
was requested at a certain point during the dispute (see table 1). 
4.2 The Game Theoretic Model and Statistical Backwards Induction 
4.2.1 The Extensive Game Form 
Figure 1 presents the WTO litigation game, with its two escalation phases, in its extensive form. 
We present a simple model of the WTO’s dispute settlement. Both governments are utility-maximizing 
and rational. Moreover, the governments in our model are forwards-looking. Hence, when the plaintiff 
drafts its settlement offer in the consultations phase, he will take into account the actions of the 
defendant, who gets to play when the WTO panels have been involved. More specifically, the plaintiff 
will take into account his expected utility from each of the different actions the defendant can take. 
We focus on the escalation at two phases: the panel stage and the implementation stage. At each of 
these stages, the dispute can escalate. At the panel stage, a dispute can escalate into the establishment 
of a panel, rather than a bilateral settlement. At the implementation stage, a dispute can escalate 
whenever no bilateral settlement is agreed upon and whenever the defendant fails to implement the 
panel’s ruling. In this instance, the dispute escalates when the plaintiff requests the authorization to 
suspend some of its concessions towards the defendant as a means of punishment. At each of these 
escalation phases, one of the two parties has to decide which action to take. At the first escalation 
phase, the distinction between offering a settlement or empaneling a dispute is relevant when we 
model the pay-offs of the plaintiff. The first escalation phase boils down to either a friendly solution to 
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the conflict or an escalation to WTO panels. Settling a dispute during the consultations is a risk-free 
option. When the dispute escalates and WTO panels get involved, the dispute will become a rather 
costly undertaking, without any guarantee that eventually the defendant will adapt its policy. However, 
there are certain considerations that might push a plaintiff to empanel a dispute. The plaintiff might 
decide to involve panels out of political considerations, as launching a real WTO investigation might 
signal the plaintiff’s domestic industry that it is willing to stand strong. Furthermore, the plaintiff might 
expect a better settlement after the WTO panels have released their opinion. However, in this case, it is 
also possible that the plaintiff underestimates the defendant’s willingness to stand strong, which the 
latter can do by refusing to adapt its policy. This is incorporated in the structural model, as none of the 
parties to the dispute has perfect information regarding the other party’s pay-offs.  
At the second escalation phase, the defendant gets to choose to adapts his policy by either adapting its 
policy (by implementing the panel’s recommendations or finding an agreement with the plaintiff), or 
stand strong and keep its policy as is, with the risk of facing CVMs. The defendant tries to maximize its 
utility given the decision of the plaintiff in the first escalation phase. If CVMs are not costly for the 
defendant, or when the latter wants to stand strong, the defendant will be less likely to adapt its policy. 
Notably, we focus on the panel rulings, rather than the eventual outcome of a dispute in terms of policy 
changes (for an analysis of the eventual level of concessions, see Busch and Reinhardt, 2000, 2003). This 
results in the following simplified game tree (see fig.1). 
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
The settlement of trade disputes at the WTO is a rather complex process. Trade policies, and the parties’ 
positions change over time. Public and secret negotiations can also be carried out, which might deter 
the filing of a complaint. Moreover, as shown in Van Kerckhoven and Crombez (2015b), the industry-
government interaction in the preparation of a case for WTO adjudication results in biased adjudication, 
whereby certain trade barriers are less disputed than others. Furthermore, a party’s decisions might be 
motivated by elements that go beyond the dispute at hand. The decisions within WTO litigation might 
be influenced by political considerations or as a means to settle old scores. In short, the whole trade 
litigation game is dynamic and complex. All these elements make it challenging to identify and unveil the 
exact forces at work. In this paper, we consequently narrow our focus to official WTO disputes, and we 
focus on more quantifiable economic variables. We model the interaction between the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s government as a one-shot game. Albeit a simplification of the overarching grand process of 
14 
 
trade litigation, the focus on this single sub-game allows us to unveil some of the determinants of the 
decisions of governments within the WTO’s dispute settlement.  
It allows us to look at which variables affect the utilities of the players at the different steps of the game 
tree. When countries are forward looking, their choices at the consultations phase of the WTO dispute 
settlement are made in anticipation of the expected actions taken by the other country in the 
implementation phase of the litigation process. We model WTO litigation as in figure 1. Based on this 
model, we can deduct the likelihood that certain actions are taken in both phases.  
The game hence has 3 different outcomes: (1) CVMs are observed when the plaintiff engages panels 
(ep), and the defendant stands strong (ss), (2) Implementation is observed the plaintiff engages panels 
(ep) and the defendant adapts its policy (ap), (3) Bilateral settlement is observed when the plaintiff 
offers a settlement.xii  
We do not treat the panel as an active party in the WTO DSU. The WTO panels work as impartial 
arbitrators and can consequently not be modeled as an actor in its own right, as the panels make no 
strategic decisions.  
4.2.2 Structural Model 
Strategic interaction is a fundamental consideration when one studies conflicts (Signorino, 1999, 2003). 
This certainly applies to trade conflicts as well. Therefore, we apply a model of statistical backwards 
induction (SBI) (Bas, Signorino and Walker, 2008). This approach allows to incorporate the sequence of 
the strategic actions of the players in an empirical setting. The biggest advantage of SBI over traditional 
statistical models is that SBI incorporates that the parties to a WTO dispute base their decisions on the 
respective assessments of the consequences of realizing certain outcomes. Importantly, empirical 
analyses that ignore the theorized underlying strategic relationships (e.g., by either applying traditional 
models of discrete events, such as logit or probit, or selection models, such as bivariate probit) produce 
biased estimates and incorrect inferences (Signorino 1999, 2002, 2003; Signorino and Yilmaz 2003). 
By applying a SBI model, we can study the escalation phases within WTO dispute settlement by 
incorporating the actions and the sequence of the players. Since the defendant observes the actions of 
the plaintiff, this is a fully recursive model. If there is no incomplete information about the utilities for 
neither the parties nor the researcher, the game can be solved by backwards induction for any given 
specification of the utilities. If there is a single unique subgame perfect equilibrium for any particular 
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specification of utilities, such model can not be applied in an empirical fashion. The latter requires a 
probability model that puts some positive probability over all the outcomes (Signorino, 1999). Hence, for 
our analysis we assume that each party’s utility incorporates a private component. The true value of this 
component is only known by the party itself, whereas the other party and the researcher only know its 
distribution. In doing so, we add some agent error to the model. More specifically, players might 
sometimes misperceive each other’s utilities or might err in implementing their actions. Agent error 
enters the model via choices or actions at the information sets of the players rather than through the 
outcome utilities (which would result in a model with private information over the size of the utilities). 
As the variance of the error terms goes to zero, the model becomes one of players with perfect and 
complete information, who maximize their utility at each decision point. Therefore, in the limit, the 
equilibria are subgame perfect. As the variance of the error terms increases, the equilibria may at times 
resemble smoothed versions of the subgame perfect equilibria, but may at other times look very 
different from the subgame perfect equilibria because the choice probabilities affect expected utility 
calculations. 
Consequently: 
    𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷∗ (𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎) = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎) + 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐼𝐼) + 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎  
𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷
∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
Where 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷∗ (𝑥𝑥) is the true utility for the defendant (𝐷𝐷) of taking action 𝑥𝑥 (the possible actions of the 
defendant are to stand strong (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) or adapt the policy (𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎)). 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝑥𝑥) is the part of the utility that is 
observable to the plaintiff and the analyst, and α is a random component of utility which is only 
observable to the defendant. We assume that the defendant maximizes its true utility. Because the 
defendant’s actions determine the final outcomes, the utilities of his chosen action (𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎/𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) are identical 
to the utilities the defendant realizes at the related outcomes imxiiiplementation and CVMs (𝐼𝐼/𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠). 
As analyst, we do not observe the α terms and hence we can only make probabilistic statements about 
whether the defendant wants to stand strong or adapt its policy. We can only derive choice probabilities 
if we make assumptions about the distribution of the private components of the utilities. We assume 
that this distribution is Type I Extreme Value, which in turn results in logit probabilities. More 
specifically, the probabilities that the defendant  adapt its policy (𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎) or stands strong (𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎)  are given 
by: 
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𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 = 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐼𝐼)𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐼𝐼) + 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) 
  
𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠)𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐼𝐼) + 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) 
We can now turn to the first escalation phase: the panel phase. If the plaintiff makes an offer that is 
acceptable to the defendant (os), the game ends with bilateral settlement (BS). If this is not the case, the 
conflict escalates as the plaintiff decides to engage panels (ep). The plaintiff’s decision whether to settle 
or empanel the dispute is a deliberate choice, and depends on its assessment of the predicted actions of 
the defendant. The complainant’s utilities (𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶) of offering a settlement (os) (which ends the game in 
bilateral settlement (BS)) and of escalating to panels (ep) are given by: 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶
∗(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) + 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶
∗(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) = 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) + 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼) +  𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) +  (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼) + 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 
We now make the assumption that we, as analysts, face the same uncertainty as the players. Due to our 
assumption that the private component of the plaintiff’s utility is distributed Type I Extreme Value, the 
probabilities of the plaintiff to undertake either action (os/ep) are logit probabilities. Notably, they are 
based on expected utility calculations and consequently do not take the typical logit form. The 
probability that the plaintiff offers a settlement or decides to involve panels are respectively: 
𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 = 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) + 𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) = 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) + 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼)+ 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠)  
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 = 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎)𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) + 𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) = 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼)+𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠)𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) + 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼)+ 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠)  
The equilibrium probabilities of the strategic model are consequently (𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 ,𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). Given the 
assumption that the uncertainty is derived from Type I Extreme Value perturbations to the action 
utilities, the above equilibrium is a Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998). 
Since we take these perturbations to be independently distributed, we can calculate the outcome 
probabilities by multiplying the action probabilities along the route a dispute takes. The outcome 
probabilities (Pr) are consequently: 
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Pr(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) = 𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 Pr(𝐼𝐼) = 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 Pr(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) = 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
We can now specify the system of latent variable equation on which we build the empirical analysis. We 
observe the choice of actions of the players and assume that: 
𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶 = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) > 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) < 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) 
𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷 = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) > 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎)0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎) 
whereby 𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶=1 and 𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷=1 correspond to the plaintiff choosing to involve panels, and the defendant 
choosing to stand strong. The equilibrium action probabilities can hence be written as 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 = Pr (𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶 = 1) 
and  𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 = Pr (𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷 = 1) 
The system of latent variables underlying our empirical model can now be specified as:  
𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶
∗ = 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) −𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶∗(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠) 
𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷
∗ = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) − 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷∗ (𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎) 
with 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = 1 if 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗∗ > 0 and 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 > 0 if 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗∗ < 0 for j ε (C,D). 
The above model is a strategic random utility model. When we assign regressors to the utilities of both 
players at the different outcomes, we can estimate the action and outcome probabilities using 
maximum likelihood estimation. Before we specify the regressors, we can derive the analytical form of 
the coefficients using a system with a single parameter and regressor. Let the plaintiff’s utility under the 
three different outcomes be specified as: 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵∗ =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐼𝐼∗ =  𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠∗ =  𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋 
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We can now normalize these equations to the bilateral settlement outcome, which results in the 
following: 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵∗ − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵∗ = 0 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐼𝐼∗ − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵∗ = (𝛼𝛼2 − 𝛼𝛼1) + (𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽1)𝑋𝑋 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠∗ − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵∗ = (𝛼𝛼3−𝛼𝛼1) + (𝛽𝛽3 − 𝛽𝛽1)𝑋𝑋 
The plaintiff will hence decide to empanel a dispute when (1 − ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)�𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐼𝐼∗ − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵∗ � + ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠∗ − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵∗ ) > 0 
Whereby ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠is observed probability that the defendant will stand strong. Given these specifications, the 
plaintiff’s decision rule can be written as: [𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽1 − ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝛽𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛽3)]𝑋𝑋 + (1 − ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝛼𝛼2 + ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼3 − 𝛼𝛼1 
Solving this, the coefficient of X is [(1 − ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝛽𝛽2 + ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝛽𝛽3 − 𝛽𝛽1] 
In order to facilitate the interpretation, we make some reasonable additional assumptions about β1, β2 
and β3. If a regressor is only relevant for a single outcome, we can simplify the interpretation. For 
example, the size and nature of CVMs only affects the plaintiff’s utility once the CVMs have materialized. 
As a result, the coefficient simplifies to ?̂?𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝛽𝛽3. In other instances, it makes sense to assume that the 
parameters are affecting the utilities for two outcomes. There may be costs related to the empanelment 
of a dispute irrespective of the defendant’s decision whether to end the conflict with CVMs or 
implementation. In this case, the coefficient of X is equal to β2 and β3.  
We now only need to make one more assumption, namely that when the plaintiff decides to involve 
WTO panels, he is not able to reverse this decision. More precise, when the plaintiff involves WTO 
panels, the utilities eventually realized by the plaintiff are decided upon by the defendant. This is a 
simplification of the WTO litigation model as the plaintiff might settle after panels for a lower reward, if 
this enables the plaintiff to push the defendant away from standing strong. However, given the fact that 
we model the plaintiff as forward-looking, and enable the plaintiff to have some information (albeit 
imperfect) about the utilities of the defendant, this assumption seems reasonable.  
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This setup ensures that the parameter estimates are not biased and inconsistent (Signorino and Yilmaz, 
2003). The SBI produces consistent estimators for all parameters, and for the error terms of the 
defendant, since his actions do not depend on any auxiliary parameters. The standard errors of the 
plaintiff’s parameters might be biased, but we can address this issue by bootstrapping the standard 
errors. This is necessary since the choice of the plaintiff depends on the expected choice of the 
defendant. The predicted probabilities are substituted into the plaintiff’s equations, and are afterwards 
entered as data for the plaintiff’s decision. Consequently, a correction for the presence of the random 
action probability is necessary. Bas, Signorino, and Walker (2008) show that a nonparametric bootstrap 
solves this issue. 
4.2.3 Pay-offs 
The model above presents three different possible outcomes, namely bilateral settlement, 
implementation and CVMs. 
At the panel escalation phase, the plaintiff calls the shots. Its utility for bilateral settlement has been 
normalized to zero. However, when he decides to engage panels, utilities at the two outcomes are 
realized. Its decision to engage panels is determined by the variables at the outcomes. At the 
implementation outcome, the two variables at play are whether the plaintiff is a developing country and 
whether the ACWL has been involved.  
When the game ends in CVMs, the plaintiff’s initial decision to engage panels will have been impacted 
by whether the issue at hand is political sensitive, whether the industry involved is a primary sector, 
whether the defendant is a developing country, whether there are significant exports from the 
defendant to the plaintiff, and whether the plaintiff has dealt with CVMs before.  
At the last step, the defendant’s utility will depend on certain variables. First, the defendant’s utility will 
be lower with CVMs when the defendant is a developing country. In this case, the installation of CVMs 
on his exports are a serious threat as these might be very harmful to a developing country. However, 
when the defendant faces a developing country plaintiff, the utility from escalating is higher since a 
developing plaintiff might be less capable of installing CVMs. The defendant’s utility of CVMs will also be 
lower when the plaintiff has ample opportunity to retaliate. Prior involvement with CVMs might also 
result in a higher utility for the defendant of escalating the dispute. Letting a political sensitive issue 
escalate might also result in more utility, as domestic audiences might approve of such a hard stance. 
When there are multiple complainants, the defendant might implement the panel rulings more easily, 
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since that if he lets the dispute escalate, more parties can request CVMs on his products. However, it 
might also be that reaching a settlement with multiple complainants is more difficult than when facing 
only one party. 
The plaintiff realizes different utilities depending on the two possible actions of the defendant. First, a 
developing country plaintiff could be expected to prefer settlement or implementation. Additionally, the 
ACWL might also help parties to take full advantage of the WTO dispute settlement, which in case of 
developing countries could relate to better settlement offerings. Second, we expect the plaintiff to get 
more utility from CVMs when the issue at hand is a political sensitive sector or a primary sector.  The 
same holds when the plaintiff faces a developing country defendant, when he has more exports going to 
the defendant (easier retaliation) and when he is more experienced with CVMs.  
Following the theoretical considerations, we can assign the variables to the outcomes as follows (in 
brackets the abbreviations): 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 0 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐼𝐼 = 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,6𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃) + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,7𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷,𝐼𝐼 = 0 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,1𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒(𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼) + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,2𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶(𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵)+ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,4𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦(𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷)+ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,5 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) 
𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,1𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 (𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷) + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,2𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷)+ 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)+  𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,4𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,5𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶(𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼)+ 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,6 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 
This gives rise to two logit regressions to be estimated. The first one estimates the coefficients for the 
defendant’s decision to stand strong and incur CVMs. The second one estimates the coefficients for the 
plaintiff’s decision to empanel a dispute, which takes into account the predicted probabilities of the 
defendant’s decision at the second escalation phase (𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎and 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). The regressors are based on the 
utilities described above, whereas the logit form has been discussed more extensively in section 4.2.2.  
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Hence we perform a logit regression for the defendant: 
𝑎𝑎(𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷 = 1|𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶 = 1) = 11 + 𝑒𝑒−(𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,0+𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,1𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷+𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,2𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷+𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,3𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷+ 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,4𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶+𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,5𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼+𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷,6 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 
And for the plaintiff: 
𝑎𝑎(𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶 = 1) = 11 + 𝑒𝑒−(𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗�𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,1𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼+𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,2𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵+𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,3𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷+𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,4𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷+𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶�+𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗�𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,6𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷+𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,7𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�) 
5. Results and Discussion 
It is important to take into account the fact that there are both direct and indirect utilities in this game. 
Due to the forward-looking nature of the dispute parties, the variables featuring in the last stage will 
also indirectly appear in the utility functions at the earlier stage. The direct influence is observable in the 
regression terms, whereas the indirect influence enters the probabilities that drive the plaintiff’s 
decision at the consultation phase. The direct and indirect effects can offset each other.  
5.1 Implementation Phase 
Let us first start at the last stage, whether the defendant decides to let the dispute escalate or whether 
to adapt tis policy (by implementing the panel recommendation or settling the dispute). 
As shown in table 4’s first column, the defendant could get a higher utility from escalating a dispute 
when a few determinants are at play.  
The defendant gets a higher utility from escalating the dispute when he exports more to the plaintiff. 
This is in conformity to the commonly held view in the literature. It might hence be that countries with 
higher trade values between them end up escalating WTO disputes more often. The large number of 
EU/US disputes ending in CVMs might bias these findings. Since these two economies are often head to 
head on a large number of trade disputes, their trade frictions account for almost 20% of all WTO 
disputes. Compared to the other WTO dispute parties, their bilateral disputes often end in CVMs.  
Being a developing country lowers the utility of standing strong. So, developing countries defendants 
are more likely to adapt their policy. This is in line with the findings of relevant literature on this topic.  
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
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In conformity with the literature, the defendant gets a higher utility from escalating the dispute when he 
has prior experience with CVMs and when the issue at hand is politically sensitive.  A defendant who has 
been involved in CVMs before, benefits more when escalating the dispute further. This clearly shows 
that there might be some learning effects in dealing with CVMs. When the issue is of a more political 
sensitive nature, the defendant will gain by standing strong, and showing support to the industry 
involved. In disputes involving multiple complainants, the defendant might also prefer CVMs over 
settlement. This can be due to the fact that he might expect that not all plaintiffs might want to install 
CVMs. Literature yet has to study this issue further in order to draft strong conclusions about the role of 
multiple complainants in WTO dispute settlement. Moreover there is a strong negative constant term, 
which demonstrates that escalation comes at a cost at the implementation phase. The predictive power 
of the model at this step is rather high (81,14% correctly specified). 
5.2 Panel Phase 
Anticipating the defendant’s decision at the implementation phase, the plaintiff makes his decision to 
offer a settlement or empanel a dispute. In order to estimate this regression, we transform the variables 
included in the plaintiff’s utility of empaneling a dispute. This is done by weighing the variables with the 
predicted probability that the defendant decides to stand strong or adapt its policy. This predicted 
probability is generated during the first logit regression (the defendant’s decision) (see 4.4.2.2). By doing 
so, the anticipation of the defendant’s decision features in the plaintiff’s decision. 
 
At the consultations phase, the plaintiff decides whether to settle or empanel a dispute. We use the 
probabilities generated during the logit regression for the implementation escalation phase to update 
the variables in order to determine the plaintiff’s utilities at the consultations phase.  
Table 4 presents the results of the analysis of the plaintiff’s utilities in the second column. Some 
variables have a positive effect on early settlement while others provide more utility if the dispute 
escalates to the panel stage.  
When the plaintiff is a developing country, he prefers to settle early. Settling early might result in a 
higher utility for a developing country plaintiff, as this allows him to skip on the costly WTO litigation 
process. Moreover, also when a plaintiff faces a developing country defendant, he prefers to settle 
early. This might deter some political backlash, as it might not sit well with the public to let a dispute 
against a developing country escalate. Moreover, as argued in Van Kerckhoven and Crombez (2015), 
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developing countries might offer higher concessions during the consultation phase. By doing so, they do 
not have to incur the legal costs that come when WTO panels are established. The higher concessions 
might give the plaintiff an higher incentive to settle the dispute before panels are established. In line 
with the literature, we find that developing countries prefer to settle earlier in the dispute settlement 
process.  
A dispute related to a more political sensitive issue will settle more easily during the consultations. Early 
settlement allows the parties to find a solution to the dispute before the conflict reaches high public 
awareness, which causes the parties to save face by standing strong. Having experience with CVMs 
increases the utility of the plaintiff of escalating the dispute. The ACWL has allowed countries to sit out 
the dispute until panels have been involved but not to a significant effect. A higher trade dependency 
also provides the plaintiff with a higher utility from escalating the dispute (albeit not significant). 
However, a high trade dependency does not lead a defendant to adapt its policy in the implementation 
escalation phase. Contradictory to our expectations, primary sector involvement leads to more bilateral 
settlement, but this finding is not statistically relevant. 
Furthermore, we can look at the indirect effect by analyzing the constants. Since the constant is 
negative at the implementation phase, it is clear that the defendant pays a price for standing strong 
compared to adapting its policy. Some other papers have looked into early settlement (Busch and 
Reinhardt, 2000 for example). They find that most full concessions are made during the consultations 
phase. We also find evidence for lower utility realizations when the dispute escalates. 
The predictive power at the consultation phase of the model is smaller than at the implementation 
phase (54,50% correctly specified). This might be due to the strategic sequential nature of our model, 
which takes interference from the implementation phase. 
6. Developing countries’ decisions in the WTO DSU. 
The approach and the model sketched in this paper allow for a deeper analysis. Some more specific 
results for developing countries can be identified. 
Let us first look into the action probabilities. First of all, a developing country plaintiff indeed settles 
earlier in the process in general. A case initiated by a developing country plaintiff has a 39,68% chance of 
making it to WTO panels (SD=0,0985). This is still rather high, but significantly lower than the probability 
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that a developed country’s complaint will make it to the panel’s phase. About half of the disputes 
initiated by developed economies (48,12%) make it to WTO panels (SD= 0,1184). This numbers are 
based upon the probabilities of the escalation to the panel that are influenced by the forward-looking 
nature of the plaintiff’s government. Once a developing country plaintiff’s complaint has made it to the 
WTO panels, the difference in action probability with a developed country becomes very small. The 
probability that a developing country plaintiff is part of an escalated dispute is 22,01% (SD= 0,20856), 
pretty much equal to that of a developed plaintiff (probability 23,567% and SD=0,22107). Hence, 
developing country plaintiffs are more likely to offer a settlement than to empanel a dispute compared 
to developed countries. However, in the implementation phase, they are as likely as developed 
countries to face CVMs. This shows that the filing of a complaint is a deliberate decision for developing 
countries as well. Remarkable is that countries apparently do not care whether the plaintiff is a 
developing country. Defendants are as likely to stand strong facing a developing country plaintiff as a 
developed country plaintiff. Thus, developing country defendants are able to attract policy adaptation as 
much as developed countries. One caveat here is that we do not take into account the exact amount of 
policy concessions.  
Also, developing countries, when on the defending side, have some action probabilities that are 
different from developed defendants. A dispute involving a developing country defendant is less likely to 
make it to WTO panels than a dispute with a developed country defendant. The former cases have a 
37,29% (SD= 0,10307) probability to make it to the WTO panels, whereas a case involving a developed 
country defendant has a 49,22% probability (SD=0,10284) to make it to WTO panels. Importantly, 
developing country defendants are more prone to giving in at the last stage. They only have a 7,27% 
probability (SD=0,0872584) of picking an escalation of the dispute. Non-developing countries on the 
other hand have a 34,166% probability (SD=0,2127972) of escalating the dispute. Consequently, 
developing country defendants are more often part of a dispute that settles in the consultation phase, 
and are far less likely to not adapt their policy in the implementation phase. Developing countries thus 
give in very easily in both escalation phases. This might relate to a lack of legal capacity but just as well 
to a fear of facing retaliation by a plaintiff. The discrepancy in outcomes between developed and 
developing country defendants is a very important one, and strengthens the call for the strengthening of 
the ACWL and its work for defendants. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a strategic statistical model to look into the determinants that influence the 
route a WTO dispute takes. We are mainly concerned with the decisions that countries make during 
WTO dispute settlement. The novelty is that we model forward-looking governments that take into 
account the decisions of the other party. The paper looks into the different characteristics of WTO 
parties, to empirically test which determinants might influence the route a WTO dispute takes. 
The focus is on testing whether developing countries indeed have equal access and realize similar 
outcomes with the WTO DSU. The strengthening of WTO litigation has been put forward as a landmark 
achievement for developing countries. However, academic literature has also been concerned about the 
real impact of these changes. This paper adds to our understanding of developing countries’ actions 
during WTO dispute settlement. We further include some variables that have been put forward by the 
literature as determinants for the outcome of a dispute. These are both situated at the country level, 
and the industry level.  
This paper contributes to our understanding of the actions taken by developing countries during WTO 
litigation. We find that developing country plaintiffs are more likely to offer a settlement than to 
empanel a dispute compared to developed countries. In the implementation phase, they are not more 
or less likely to face a stand strong position by a defendant. Consequently, defendants are not 
concerned with the developing/ developed nature of the plaintiff in the dispute. For developing country 
defendants, the picture looks even less appealing. Developing country defendants settle a dispute more 
easily in the consultation phase, and are far less likely to stand strong in the implementation phase. The 
involvement of the ACWL does not seem to be able to strongly shift these findings. Most importantly, 
we show that developing countries take different decisions in particular when acting as a defendant. 
Even when we include a numer of other variables in the model, the developing nature of a country 
remains an important determinant. This also shows in their action probabilities which clearly show that 
developing defendants take different decisions tah their developed counterparts within the WTO DSU.  
Future WTO DSU reforms should mainly focus on supporting developing countries when a dispute is 
filed against them. Moreover, future research should clearly take into account these differences, rather 
than solely looking at the aggregate outcomes of disputes involving developing countries.  
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Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the WTO DSU has levelled the playing field for developing 
countries. We further find evidence for early settlement of political sensitive issues. However, once a 
panel has been established that deals with these issues, more escalation will be observed. Disputes with 
multiple complainants also often result in CVMs if not settled during the consultations phase. Prior 
involvement with CVMs increases the utility of the parties to escalate the dispute to the next phase.  
Another important result is that escalation always comes at a cost. When the dispute does not settle in 
the consultation phase, the plaintiff’s utility suffers. This is in line with Busch and Reinhardt (2000) who 
argue that most utility is realized in the consultation phase.  
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8. Tables and figures 
Table 1: Overview of panel and CVM requests 
 No panel Panel Total 
Implementation 236 130 366 
CVMs 0 45 45 
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Table 2: Theoretical concepts and operationalization 
 Variable Definition 
Utility Plaintiff  
(Implementation) 
Developing Country Plaintiff 
ACWL 
Dummy equal to 1 if plaintiff is a developing country 
Dummy equal to 1 if plaintiff involves the ACWL  
Utility Plaintiff 
(CVMs) 
Political Sensitive Sector 
 
Primary Sector 
Developing Country Defendant 
 
Trade Dependency 
 
Experience 
Dummy equal to 1 if dispute mentions a political 
sensitive agreement 
Dummy equal to 1 if sector is low-velocity 
Dummy equal to 1 if defendant is a developing 
country 
The percentage of exports from the defendant to 
the plaintiff over the total export of the defendant 
Dummy equal to 1 when the plaintiff has dealt with 
CVMs before 
Utility Defendant 
(CVMs) 
Political Sensitive Sector 
 
Primary Sector 
Trade Dependency 
 
Experience 
 
Multiple Plaintiffs 
Dummy equal to 1 if dispute mentions a political 
sensitive agreement 
Dummy equal to 1 if sector is low-velocity 
The percentage of exports from the defendant to 
the plaintiff over the total export of the defendant 
Dummy equal to 1 when the plaintiff has dealt with 
CVMs before 
Dummy equal to 1 when there is more than one 
plaintiff 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 N Mean S. Dev.  Min. Max. 
Developing Plaintiff 411 0.423358 0.494693 0 1 
ACWL Plaintiff 411 0.058394 0.234773 0 1 
Political Sensitivity 411 0.218978 0.414058 0 1 
Primary Sector 411 0.491484 0.500537 0 1 
Developing Defendant 411 0.391728 0.488731 0 1 
Trade Dependency 411 0.120298 0.158074 0.000158 0.885908 
Experience Plaintiff 411 0.559611 0.497039 0 1 
Experience Defendant 411 0.50365 0.500596 0 1 
Multiple plaintiffs 411 0.082725 0.275802 0 1 
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Table 4: Regression results 
  (1) (2) 
 
Implementation 
Phase Consultation Phase 
      
Trade Dependency 1.553 0.748 
 (1.057) (3.101) 
Developing Country Defendant -0.921* -4.620** 
 (0.473) (3.061) 
Political Sensitive Sector 1.853*** -1.368 
 (0.499) (0.840) 
Experience Defendant 1.599**  
 (0.533)  
Multiple Complainants 2.171***  
 (0.610)  
Primary Sector  -0.142 
  (0.711) 
Developing Country Plaintiff  -0.573
* 
  (0.253) 
Experience Plaintiff  1.463
* 
  (0.788) 
ACWL  0.548 
  (0.561) 
Constant -2.899***  
  (0.580)   
Pseudo R² 0.229  
Observations 175 411 
   Sensitivity [Pr( + /D)] 46.67% 28.57% 
Specificity [Pr( -/~D)] 93.08% 73.73% 
Correctly Specified 81.14% 54.50% 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1: Escalation at the WTO DSU as an extensive form game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Complainant (C) 
Engage panels (ep) Offer settlement (os) 
Adapt policy (ap) Stand strong (ss) 
Defendant (D) Bilateral Settlement 
(BS) 
Implementation (I) CVMs (CVMs) 
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i See http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/argentina-trade-rows-escalate-at-wto  
ii For example, in the Bananas case, Santa Lucia needed to get outside counsel to represent its case (despite 
opposition of the EU/US, the WTO allowed Santa Lucia to do so). However, outside counsel is rather expensive.  
iii There is a relatively large literature dealing with the WTO Dispute Settlement. This literature is grossly divided in 
2 approaches. The first strand approaches the WTO dispute mechanism as an informational device. It builds upon 
the idea that the WTO agreements are incomplete contracts (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001; Horn, Maggi and Staiger, 
2010, and Maggi and Staiger, 2011 among others). Within this approach, the WTO’s dispute settlement  works to 
interpret vague provisions within the agreement, and to provide guidance on issues on which the agreement 
remains silent. The second approach sees the WTO DSU as a market enforcing device. Within this approach, the 
WTO DSU works so as to enforce the provisions in the WTO agreements. Both of these approaches have led to 
some interesting results. Sattler, Spiker and Bernauer (2014) have empirically tested which of the two approaches 
so far seems to be supported by the WTO dispute settlement data. They find that the WTO DSU mostly works as an 
enforcement device, rather than an rule clarifying device. This paper mainly look into the enforcement of trade 
commitments. 
iv See http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/canada-wto-animals.8kb  
v See http://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/oct/16/europeanunion  
vi We do not model the Appellate Body (AB) since the AB’s role is to judicially review the panel ruling. As such, 
involving the AB does not directly add another escalation phase.  
vii We base the division of developing/ developed country on the list of developing countries in the WTO. The WTO 
allows countries to self-select whether they want to be perceived as a developing country. In this paper, we 
decided to include all countries that self-selected to be a developing country to be a developing country.  
viii Ideally, we could have included the cost of WTO litigation directly into our analysis. However, there is no data 
available on the cost of individual WTO disputes. Moreover, in the literature, there is still much discussion about 
the variables that can be considered as a proxy for this. This paper takes the view that the cost of WTO litigation is 
only part of the problems that face developing countries. We hence decided to use a dummy variable to capture 
the full extent to which developing countries might be at a disadvantage within the WTO DSU. 
ix We had to delete a few observations, see 4.4.1. 
x Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2004) have presented an approach that might help countries to overcome the 
lack of retaliatory power.  
xi Three years is not a fixed term in WTO law. If a panel is not composed within 3 years (which is far above all time 
limits in the WTO DSU), it is presumably because the parties have found a bilateral solution, but did not inform the 
WTO. After the panel has been involved, the whole process (including appellate review) should never exceed 18 
months (WTO DSU Art.21.4). Parties will then get a reasonable (but limited) time to implement the findings. Taking 
a three years benchmark since the last activity in the dispute took place consequently is a reasonable and cautious 
benchmark and has also been used as a threshold by Guzman and Simmons (2002). Other authors (for example 
Bush and Reinhardt, 2003) abstract from all these cases, but this would result in a very limited number of 
observations. 
xii Since the plaintiff has some knowledge about the defendant’s pay-offs (see next section), we assume that if the 
plaintiff is willing to settle bilaterally, he will be able to draft a settlement offer that the defendant accepts. 
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